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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Australian retirement income system consists of three major pillars: 
1. A means-tested age pension that is financed from general taxation revenue; 
2. A mandatory private retirement savings component with minimum employer 
contributions of 9% on a fully funded basis (the ‘Superannuation Guarantee Charge 
(SGC)’3); and 
3. A voluntary private retirement savings component with additional contributions made at 
the discretion of employers and/or individuals. 
 
The lack of integration between the first two pillars has been identified as a major 
problem with the Australian system (Atkinson et al., 1999). This is particularly due to the 
availability of lump sum retirement benefits from superannuation savings and no compulsion 
for superannuation balances to be taken in a pension form.  
The need for the SGC (“Pillar 2”) arose due to the expected future social and economic 
implications of Australia’s ageing population, which as for many developed and developing 
nations, is becoming an increasingly significant issue4. One implication is that the number of 
individuals expected to rely on some form of the age pension will increase considerably, and 
at the same time the number of individuals in the workforce to support funding of the age 
pension will decrease5. However by various measures the age pension in Australia provides 
only a modest income, and with many individuals expected to outlive their retirement 
savings, there is a growing need for retirees to protect themselves against the associated 
longevity6 and investment7 risks.  
This paper quantifies, for a cohort of male workers employed full-time, the marginal 
increase in guaranteed income that would accrue as a result of being compelled to purchase a 
lifetime annuity from superannuation savings. It also quantifies potential financial 
implications of this compulsion on the provision of the age pension.  
 
SUPERANNUATION8 
 
The introduction and subsequent increases in the SGC aimed to provide a means for 
individuals to fund their retirement in an effort to curb the effects of Australia’s ageing 
population (IAAust, 2009), and the growth in superannuation coverage across the Australian 
                                                 
3 The primary purpose of the SGC was to compel individuals to save in order to provide an adequate income for 
themselves during retirement (FaHCSIA, 2009). It was initially set at 3% of salary, with increases phased-in to 
reach a maximum of 9% in 2002/2003 (APRA, 2007). The recent Henry review and Australian governmental 
response in its 2010 budget has recommended a further phased increase to reach 12% by 2020 (Commonwealth, 
2010). 
4 Population ageing is due to changes in fertility and mortality rates, both of which have been falling for more 
than a century (McDonald & Kippen, 2004). It will contribute to substantial pressure on government spending 
over the next 40 years. Increases in health, aged care and age pension spending will increase from 7.5% of GDP 
currently to 13.8% of GDP in 2050, which in 2009-10 dollars equates to a tripling of real spending per person 
(Treasury, 2010).  
5 By 2050 the number of Australia’s population aged 65 to 84 will double, the number 85 and over will more 
than quadruple, and 23% of the population will be aged 65 and older. The number of people in the potential 
workforce for every individual aged 65 and over will fall from 5 to 2.7 (Treasury, 2010). 
6 Longevity risk is the risk that retirement savings and investments may be inadequate to sustain the individual 
as a result of decreasing mortality over time. 
7 Investment risk is the risk that the individual’s invested superannuation funds will not yield the returns 
required to provide an adequate income in retirement. 
8 In Australia the colloquial meaning of “superannuation” is distinct from that of a pension, where in general the 
former applies to pre-retirement savings and the latter applies to post-retirement income. 
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population is testimony to the success and breadth of this public-policy intent. However, 
while superannuation balances are increasing as the system matures, average superannuation 
balances are below those anticipated when compulsory superannuation was introduced in 
1992, including a number of groups with low levels of superannuation (Clare, 2007). Recent 
events such as the global financial crisis (GFC) compounds this issue, where Australia’s 
superannuation funds experienced real losses of 26.7% in 2008, primarily due to the high 
proportion (57%) of investments held in equities (OECD, 2009). 
A continuing demand for further assistance to achieve a modest standard of living in 
retirement is likely, perhaps via the Commonwealth-provided age pension as well as further 
encouragement to save. The apparent separation of pre-retirement savings and post-
retirement planning compounds this issue as the savings an individual sees accruing 
throughout their working life is not placed in the context of what that could provide as a 
retirement income (guaranteed or otherwise). 
 
THE GOVERNMENT AGE PENSION 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia introduced a means-tested ‘flat-rate’ age pension that was 
financed from general tax revenue in July 1909, which was paid to men from age 65 and 
women from age 60, subject to a residency qualification (ABS, 1988). Changes to the 
pension eligibility age in Australia have only recently been agreed, with the pension 
eligibility age set at 67 for males from 2023 and 65 for females from 20149 (Commonwealth, 
2009). 
Changes to eligibility criteria and subsequent levels of coverage have changed over 
time in line with cost pressures and political will. Approximately 60% of pensioners now 
receive the maximum rate of the age pension (OECD, 2009). Projections for 2047 reveal that 
the proportion of aged individuals receiving some form of the age pension is expected to 
remain at approximately 75%; but increases in superannuation assets and income will reduce 
the proportion of pensioners receiving the full pension to 35% (Treasury, 2007). 
Age pension benefit rates were generally increased on an ad hoc basis until the 1970s, 
with consumer price index-related and wage growth-related increases implemented thereafter. 
In 1997 the single pension rate was benchmarked to at least 25% of the MTAWE10 
(FaHCSIA, 2008). The overall result is that since 1970, the real value of the maximum single 
and couples pension rates has increased by approximately 200% (FaHCSIA, 2008). More 
recently the single age pension was set to two-thirds of the age pension couple’s rate 
(Commonwealth, 2009). However, the level of the single age pension11 is still below the level 
required to provide an adequate income for a single retiree according to various measures 
(see Table 1). 
According to the OECD (2009), 27% of Australians aged over 65 have incomes below 
the OECD poverty threshold. This figure is particularly high due to the relatively low level of 
income provided by Australia’s age pension, which is estimated to be 20% less than 
equivalent schemes in other OECD countries12. 
 
                                                 
9 This is despite the fact that life expectancy in Australia has increased from 55 to 79 years for men and from 59 
to 83 years for women over the last century (ABS, 2008a).   
10 The MTAWE (All Males Total Average Weekly Earnings) index is produced by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics to benchmark the level of male wages across the workforce (including full-time, part-time, casual and 
junior employees). 
11 For consistency of comparison to other measures, the 2009 figure of $17,555 per annum is used. 
12 For example, the average annual benefit received by an age pensioner in Australia is equivalent to 23% of 
Australia’s average earnings (US$41,600), while for New Zealand the equivalent figure is 41% (OECD 2009). 
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Table 1: Measures of Adequacy in Retirement (annual income) 
Adequacy Measure Recommended Income  
Westpac ASFA Retirement Standard Modest Lifestyle13 
Westpac ASFA Retirement Standard Comfortable Lifestyle 
$19,533 
$37,822 
OECD Poverty Threshold14 $27,600 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia recommended replacement Rate15 $38,640 
 
THE RETIREMENT INCOME MARKET 
 
Currently, allocated pension products account for more than 85% of the retirement income 
market (IFSA, 2007)16. However, one concern with these products is that they do not offer 
retirees complete protection against longevity and investment risks as they do not offer a 
guaranteed income17. Furthermore, with sudden falls in equity markets such as during the 
GFC, this sort of shock for an individual drawing down a retirement income from an 
allocated pension could be financially catastrophic. 
The fact that an individual faces significant longevity and investment risks in providing 
an income throughout retirement is complicated further by the tendency of individuals to 
underestimate their life expectancy (Banks et al., 2004; O’Brien et al., 2005), as well as low 
levels of financial literacy, as demonstrated via several surveys (ANZ 2002, 2005, 2008; FLF 
2007). It is also exacerbated by the implicit assumption within the preference for allocated 
pensions that retirees prefer to not have a guaranteed income in retirement. It seems peculiar 
that retirees are willing to take a risk that they may not have a derived income at some point, 
that they were not willing to take in the course of their working lives (for example, leaving a 
safe job and going into their own business for the sake of a higher income/return). This 
assumption or decision of greater risk taking in retirement against the backdrop of having less 
ability to do anything about it if things go wrong, compared to one’s working life, appears to 
suggest that retirees are not well versed in the risks that they face with the status quo. As such 
a responsible policy focus should be increasingly on ensuring that retirement income can be 
sustained throughout an individual’s life (AFR, 2009). 
 
ANNUITIES 
 
A range of annuity products are available across various markets. These include 
conventional, temporary, deferred, guaranteed (or term-certain), value-protected, 
participating, investment-linked and variable annuities. Each have differing characteristics 
which are well described in the literature (Cannon & Tonks, 2008; Loh & Gosden, 2007; 
MacDonald et al., 2011), and payments can be fixed in nominal terms (“level”), fixed in real 
terms (“inflation-indexed”), or increased at a pre-specified rate (“graded”). Of particular 
interest to the analysis in this paper is a conventional life annuity, which provides a periodic 
income for as long as the annuitant is alive. 
                                                 
13 Westpac-ASFA (2009). 
14 Equal to half of the median household income (OECD, 2009). 
15 The Institute of Actuaries of Australia recommends a replacement rate of 70-80% (IAAust 2002). The per 
annum income shown in the table is 70% of the median household income calculated by the OECD (2009). 
16 This is mainly due to tax exemption on their investment earnings, the range of investment options available 
and potential for high returns, with the only real restriction on the individual being that regular income 
withdrawals must reside within a specified range (IAAust, 2009). 
17 For example, for a male aged 60 with an account balance of $360,000 and 30% held in domestic equities as a 
proxy for growth assets, there is a 46% chance of allocated pension fund depletion before age 86 (Rawlinson & 
Cater, 2008). 
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The popularity of product types varies from market to market. For example, variable 
annuities are popular in the US; level annuities currently dominate the UK market; while over 
90% of annuities purchased in Singapore are deferred annuities (Fong 2002; Cannon & 
Tonks, 2008; Lewis, 2009). 
 
Advantages 
 
A main advantage of purchasing a conventional life annuity over other retirement income 
products is the protection provided against longevity risk as an income for life is guaranteed. 
It also provides protection against investment risk by transferring this risk to the annuity 
provider. The theoretical result of Yaari (1965) demonstrated that complete annuitisation is 
optimal for a risk-averse individual facing an uncertain lifetime. Annuities are also the most 
financially efficient way of providing an income stream from capital due to the pooling of 
risk (DWP, 2002), although this only occurs if the annuitant population mortality is 
representative of the general population mortality.  
 
Lack of popularity 
 
Given that lifetime annuities are beneficial in alleviating risks to the individual in retirement, 
demand for annuities could be expected to be high – but in Australia this is not the case as 
few individuals choose to purchase lifetime annuities and the retirement income market is 
dominated by allocated pension products. Many reasons have been put forward to explain this 
state of affairs. The US Society of Actuaries recently released a research report (MacDonald 
et al., 2011) which provides a comprehensive list of reasons as to why annuities are not 
popular in markets where their purchase is voluntary, broken into three main categories 
(number of distinct reasons in brackets): 
1. Rational decisions arising from personal preferences and circumstances (10); 
2. Rational decisions arising from environmental limitations (7); and 
3. Decisions arising from behavioural biases (17) 
 
The reasons are not repeated here, but it is noted that most researchers agree that for a 
particular market, no one reason is adequate to explain the low demand18. Unsurprisingly, 
annuity markets flourish in countries that compel individuals to purchase annuities, such as in 
the UK19, but more surprising is that annuity sales only tend to flourish in these markets 
(Cannon & Tonks, 2008). 
 
                                                 
18 Also, there are dependencies between different reasons, and many postulated reasons themselves have 
arguments against them being a significant factor, For example, one obvious reason to not purchase an annuity 
is the lack of bequest upon early death (this is a “rational decision arising from personal preferences”). This 
implies the individual sees the annuity purchase in an investment context (whereby annuities appear unattractive 
since there is a probability of losing a large amount upon ‘early’ death), rather than in an insurance context 
(viewing annuities positively as insurance that guarantees an income for life). This is “decision framing” (a 
“decision arising from behavioural biases”). However, evidence on the importance of bequest motivations is 
mixed: some studies claim that individuals consciously leave wealth to heirs (Bernheim, 1991; Laitner & Juster, 
1996; Wilhelm 1996), others find no evidence of bequest motives among the elderly (Hurd, 1987, 1989), others 
find that bequest motives have a trivial impact on the annuity decision (Brown et al., 2008), and Rowlingson and 
McKay (2005) conclude that whilst inheritance is considered important, it is not entrenched as either an 
expectation or a duty. 
19 It is compulsory in the UK for individuals to use a certain proportion of their pension funds to generate 
income. In 2007, 78% of pension funds were converted into income streams through annuities, and the 
remaining 22% were converted through products similar to Australia’s allocated pension (Lewis, 2009). 
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COMPULSION 
 
The view of the UK Treasury is that tax relief on pension contributions is solely provided so 
individuals can save for an income during retirement (HM Treasury, 2006). Thus for the 
Australian context, it is arguable that concessional tax on superannuation savings should be 
coupled to a retirement income provision that gives optimal outcomes at a collective 
(“pooled”) level – in other words an annuity20. Therefore, compelling individuals to convert 
some or all of their superannuation balances into an annuity for the purposes of retirement 
income, is a policy option worthy of some consideration. The authors make no claim that this 
is the best approach, or a required one to optimise public policy goals, but the intent is simply 
to examine the implications if there were such a requirement. 
Compulsion could mandate the purchase of an annuity from a portion of superannuation 
savings, with many possibilities regarding the form and substance that this could take. For 
example, a set percentage of savings could be annuitised, or a certain dollar value, or a 
combination subject to some minimums, maximums or relative size to the age pension. The 
relative worth of various combinations in itself is worthy of further discussion, but is not 
advanced here.  
An obvious objection to compulsion is being told what to do with what is considered a 
personal asset. A response could be that many things relating to an individual’s time and 
financial assets are already compelled because it is deemed beneficial at a societal level. For 
example, schooling is compulsory for certain ages, paying tax is also compulsory, as is the 
effective deferment of pay for one’s work – otherwise known as the SGC. The potential to 
compel in the retirement phase is not necessarily a barrier too far, given the right case and 
appeal to the collective ‘good’. 
An expected advantage of compulsory annuitisation is that a more effective pooling of 
longevity risk will lead to a reduced price for annuities. This arises because mortality 
experience will reflect that of the general population as opposed to a ‘select’ population under 
voluntary annuitisation.  
A retirement income system with some form of compulsory annuitisation may 
potentially be a way to ensure Australians use their superannuation balances for their 
intended purpose: to fund their retirement. This could also help relieve the increasing costs 
associated with funding the age pension, which is a major concern given the projected 
demographic changes for Australia. Hence, this is considered as the bridge between the 
availability of lump sum retirement benefits from superannuation savings, and the need to 
deliver post retirement income. The analysis in this paper explores this option in more detail. 
 
POLICY OPTIONS CONSIDERED 
 
Retirees are assumed to annuitise a minimum of 75% of their superannuation balance at 
retirement21. Retirement income is defined as the sum of the annuity payment arising from a 
purchase via superannuation balances at age 67, plus the resultant level of the age pension 
that an individual is entitled to. Changes in retirement income and the cost of the age pension 
are considered under a number of different policy options. These are as follows: 
                                                 
20 Hence, it may be that approaches to annuitisation focus on different options for employer-provided versus 
voluntary superannuation components. 
21 Addressing longevity is a pressing issue, however flexibility in retirement is also important and as such partial 
annuitisation of superannuation balances was considered an appropriate trade-off. A partial annuitisation policy 
retains an incentive for voluntary superannuation contributions, and is likely to be straightforward to implement 
given that the policy applies the same rule across all individuals and so is likely to be considered ‘fair’, and 
arguably it partially addresses aversions to annuities stemming from bequest arguments. 
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a. Voluntary annuity purchase; 
b. Compulsory annuity purchase under private provision; 
c. Compulsory annuity purchase under Government provision22; and 
d. Compulsory annuity purchase under Government provision with revised means-
testing of the age pension 
 
An individual in Australia is currently subject to both income and asset testing for the 
age pension, with the applicable pension rate being the lower one arising from these two 
tests. For policy options (a) – (c)23, the 2009 income and asset tests as per below were 
assumed to apply: 
 
Table 2: Age Pension Income and Asset Tests, per annum  
 Income Test Asset Test 
 Free 
threshold 
Part payment 
cut-off1 
Free  
threshold 
Part payment 
cut-off2 
Homeowner $3,692 $38,802 $178,000 $628,128 
Non-homeowner $3,692 $38,802 $307,000 $757,128 
Reduction in 
pension 
payments 
 
Income over the free 
threshold amount reduces 
pension payments by $0.50 
in the dollar. 
Assets over the free threshold 
amounts reduce pension 
payments by $39 per annum3 
for every $1,000 of assets over 
the limit. 
Source: Centrelink (2009), Commonwealth (2009) 
1 When only income is taken into consideration. 
2 When only assets are taken into consideration. 
3 According to the current penalty of $1.50 per fortnight for every $1,000 of assets over the limit. 
 
For policy option (d), given the compulsion to purchase an annuity using 75% of 
superannuation funds, it is inappropriate to assess individuals against both income and asset 
tests. Hence policy option (d) assesses means-testing of the age pension according to an 
adjusted income test only, but strengthened to compensate for the removal of the assets test. 
The revised income test adopts a free threshold of $10,000 above which any income, 
excluding employment income24, reduces pension payments by $0.85 in the dollar. This 
implies a part pension payment cut-off of $30,65325. 
 
                                                 
22 Government provision of annuities under compulsion is considered because it focuses the analysis on the 
effects of compulsion rather than additional conditions required to make compulsion happen via the private 
sector; it allows simplified assumptions to be made regarding expenses and profit requirements; and it mitigates 
concerns regarding the risk of institutional failure thus removing one reason for compulsion to not be supported. 
For philosophical and well considered reasons this option may be subject to some objection, but it is considered 
here nonetheless and is in line with recent suggestions that indicate that optimal efficiency of a compulsory 
arrangement may be achieved via Government provision (Sherris & Evans, 2009).  
23 Also, options (a) – (c) assumed means-testing of annuities according to the current rules: individuals are only 
income tested on their ‘assessable income’, which is equal to annuity income minus an ‘income deduction’; and 
the purchase price of an annuity is considered to be assessable under the assets test (Centrelink, 2009). The per 
annum ‘income deduction’ is calculated as the annuity purchase price divided by the life expectancy assumed in 
the pension system. 
24 One reason to exclude employment income from income testing is to encourage older individuals to remain in 
the workforce, which increases their income, alleviates the cost of the age pension through additional tax 
receipts, and potentially fulfils a role in relieving projected employment shortages (Treasury, 2007). This means 
that income earned from employment would be taxed at marginal taxation rates on personal income. 
25 This is equal to 10,000 + 17,555 / 0.85. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
All analysis is based upon projections for a male aged 30 in 2009, with the fact that the 
superannuation system is expected to be fully mature by 2037 (NATSEM, 2009) shaping this 
choice26. Males are chosen due to their higher propensity to work full-time without breaks 
over their entire working lives, which suits the purposes of the projections that follow. 
Under each policy option superannuation balances are projected to retirement, with a 
minimum of 75% then assumed to purchase an annuity. This amount is set equal to the 
expected present value (EPV27) of a conventional life annuity of $X per year, after 
accounting for expenses, commission and profit margins. Solving for X gives the annual 
annuity payment. The present value of the resultant age pension is then also calculated at that 
age in order to determine overall income. 
 
Projection Of Superannuation Balances At Retirement 
 
The distribution of superannuation balances was projected out to age 6728. Individuals were 
assumed to work full-time and then retire at age 67, not drawdown their superannuation 
before then, and not make additional voluntary superannuation contributions29. The required 
assumptions for this projection are provided below in Table 3 (Appendix A provides further 
details). 
The resulting estimates of nominal superannuation balances at age 67 (relating to the 
year 2046) were adjusted for general price inflation to obtain superannuation balances at 
retirement in 2009 dollars, for various point estimates. A regression was fitted to these point 
estimates to obtain an approximation for the distribution, between the 5th and 95th percentile, 
of superannuation balances. Details are provided in Appendix B. This distribution suggests 
that half of the male population retiring in 2046 (aged 67) will have superannuation balances 
of more than $353,612 (in 2009 dollars). 
 
Projection Of Present Value Of The Age Pension 
 
To estimate the present value of age pension payments for a male aged 67 in 2046, various 
assumptions are required. These are provided in Appendix C. In particular, the full rate of the 
single age pension was assumed as $17,555 per annum (Commonwealth, 2009), and because 
an estimate is sought in real dollars, a real (and risk-free) discount rate was used, in 
conjunction with age pension payments unadjusted for inflation.  
To enable a wider canvassing of potential future outcomes, the present value of age 
pension payments were calculated under combinations of mortality rates relating to 
                                                 
26 Of course, other demographic model points can be considered in future work, but the cohort of workers 
between the ages of 25 and 34 is the first cohort, for which data is available, to retire having received 
compulsory superannuation contributions of 9% over the whole of their working lives. 
27 An expected present value basis (also termed actuarial present value) accounts not only for the time value of 
money via the use of an appropriate discount rate, but also for the probability of future payment being impacted 
by mortality. 
28 67 is the age at which an individual will be eligible for the age pension from 2025 (Commonwealth, 2009), 
and it allows the determination of the interaction of annuity incomes with the age pension. 
29 All of these assumptions can of course be varied to match any combination of future employment and 
behavioural patterns, but this base case is established with future research left to consider a wider range of 
scenarios. 
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improvements up to 2046, and improvements beyond 204630. Table 3 shows the expected 
present value (EPV) of age pension payments for a male aged 67 in 2046 under the mortality 
bases considered. 
 
Table 3: Assumptions adopted for the projection of superannuation balances 
Item Assumption 
Salary In accordance with salary distribution estimated from 
the ABS Statistics. 
Starting superannuation 
balance 
In accordance with the distribution of superannuation 
balances estimated from ABS Surveys. 
General salary increases 
due to inflation and 
productivity 
4.00% per annum 
 
Promotional salary 
increases 
In accordance with the distribution of promotional 
salary increases for the lower, median and upper 
income quartiles estimated from ABS Surveys. 
SGC 9.00% per annum31 
Tax 15.00% on both contributions and investment earnings 
Investment earnings 6.35% per annum (nominal) 
CPI increases  2.50% per annum 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated present value of age pension payments ($2009), for a male aged 67 in 
2046 
 
PV(age pension) 
Mortality improvements to 2046 
100-year trend 25-year trend 
Mortality 
improvements beyond 
2046 
100-year trend $236,175 $272,672 
25-year trend $247,558 $283,163 
 
Annuity Pricing 
 
In line with calculating EPVs for the age pension, a real (and risk-free) discount rate of 3% 
was assumed32, and projected mortality assumed mortality improvements continue up to and 
beyond 2046 according to the stated trend (25- or 100-year trend). 
Assumptions regarding annuitant mortality and expenses were based on information 
obtained from two life insurance consultants. Under voluntary purchase (policy option (a)), 
annuitant mortality was assumed to be 30% lower than population mortality at age 60 and 
20% lower than population mortality from age 90 onwards, with linear interpolation between 
these ages. Under compulsory purchase (policy options (b)-(d)), annuitant mortality was 
assumed to be population mortality. 
Initial expenses were assumed to be $800 per policy, with renewal expenses of $300 per 
policy per annum. These expense assumptions are extremely sensitive to volumes sold, and 
                                                 
30 Estimates using 25-year mortality improvement factors represent lighter mortality compared to the 100-year 
factors,  and thus give higher figures in terms of EPV.  
31 Given that an SGC of 9% is likely to be redundant from 2013 when the first increases to an SGC of 12% may 
occur, at the time of writing these increases are “recommendations” rather then enshrined in legislation, and a 
year is a long time in politics. Later sensitivity analysis considers the relative impact of an SGC of 12%. 
32 This assumption implies that future increases in the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI) are 
not larger than increases in CPI, so that age pension payments increase at the assumed rate of inflation of 2.5% 
per annum. 
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are only estimates that would likely change after the introduction of a compulsory 
annuitisation policy. 
Under private provision (policy options (a) and (b)), a profit margin at 15% of premium 
and commission charges at 3% of premium were assumed. Both of these reduced to zero 
under government provision (policy options (c) and (d)).  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The overall analysis consists of 3 scenarios, to capture uncertainty in future mortality, the 
influence of an increase in the SGC rate, and future investment earnings on superannuation 
balances: 
 
1. An SGC rate of 9% and future mortality dependent on 100-year improvement factors; 
2. An SGC rate of 9% and future mortality dependent on 25-year improvement factors; 
3. An SGC rate of 12% and future mortality dependent on 100-year improvement factors 
 
Each scenario above considers three possible investment returns – the assumed best 
estimate of 6.35%, and then returns spread 20% about that estimate (i.e. 6.35± 20%). 
 
Scenario 1: SGC = 9%, and 100-year mortality improvement factors. 
 
Figure 1 shows how income (annuity plus pension payments) compares under each policy 
option.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of total per annum incomes   
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For policy options (a) – (c) there is a noticeable ‘hump’ in the results at the 30th 
percentile. This is attributed to the interaction homeownership with the current means test for 
the age pension, where individuals in the 30th percentile are assumed to be non-homeowners. 
This ‘hump’ is smoothed out under policy option (d) when the means test is revised to an 
income test only. Table 5 summarises various statistics for all policy options. 
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Table 5: Comparison between voluntary and compulsory annuitisation 
Policy 
Option 
Average 
Income 
Median 
Income 
% above Westpac-
ASFA 
‘comfortable’ 
retirement standard 
Range of 
minimum/ 
maximum change1 
(a) $24,963 $24,633 0%2 - 
(b) $26,696 $26,251 0%2 (+2.1%, +11.1%) 
(c) $30,481 $29,740 10% (+6.9%, +35.7%) 
(d) $29,836 $28,910 10%   (+6.9%, +35.7%) 
1 When considering the change in per annum income compared to policy option (a) 
2 Note that this proportion is based on the per annum income for the 95th percentile. While individuals 
in the top 5th percentile may have incomes above the Westpac-ASFA standard, there is no reliable 
way to estimate the number of individuals who may fall in this category and as such the proportion is 
recorded as zero, though clearly it is capped above at 5%. 
 
Clearly, average incomes increase due to (1) compulsion and (2) government provision. 
Policy option (b) suggests that the benefit of compulsion is that the combined income 
received via the age pension and an annuity increases for all individuals, with the range of 
increase between 2.1% and 11.1%. For policy option (d) which also includes the effects of 
government provision and amended age pension eligibility rules, a guaranteed minimum per 
annum income between $23,007 and $41,741 (in 2009 dollars) is possible for all individuals 
between the 5th and 95th percentiles of earners. These are considered to be minimum levels 
since retirees may derive additional income from employment (not assessed under the 
modified income test) or other investments. The increase in per annum income varies 
between 6.9% and 35.7%, with a larger effect experienced by those with higher 
superannuation balances at retirement. All individuals can expect to receive at least $1,488 
more in retirement income per annum under policy option (d). The proportion of individuals 
meeting the Westpac-ASFA Standard for a comfortable retirement increases to 10%. 
Compared to the current situation (policy (a)), all individuals are better off. 
Figure 2 shows how receipt of the age pension compares under each policy option. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of per annum age pension payments  
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Pension payments under policy options (a) – (c) are not impacted, but under policy 
option (d) they are lowered due to the strengthening of the income test. Overall, 10% fewer 
individuals are expected to receive some form of the age pension and there is a decrease in 
the amount of payment received by the majority of individuals. This implies an average 
saving in the cost of the age pension of 6.6% per person under policy option (d), as the 
average pension cost for an individual decreases from $131,854 under policy options (a) – 
(c), to $123,175 under policy option (d). 
As a result, individuals between the 25th and 85th percentiles experience a decrease in 
overall income when moving from policy option (c) to policy option (d) due to a decrease in 
the amount of the age pension payment received. This result however, is deemed to be 
acceptable as the revised means test better targets the age pension at those who need it most.  
In terms of sensitivity to changes in the investment earnings on superannuation funds, 
as expected, the level of retirement income changes in line with the movement of investment 
earnings. Table 6 summarises the results. 
Under a 9% SGC, a compulsory annuitisation policy is potentially welfare-improving 
when future mortality experience follows the 100-year trend; not only are individuals 
expected to receive higher income in retirement, but the average cost of the age pension is 
expected to fall by up to10.5% per person (depending on the investment earnings 
experience). 
 
Table 6: Changes in average per annum income between policy option (a) base case and 
policy options (b) – (d), under 9% SGC and 100-year mortality trends 
Policy 
option 
 
 Investment Earnings 
 20% Lower Base Case33 20% Higher 
(a) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(b) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+5.8% 
0.0% 
+6.9% 
0.0% 
+7.9% 
0.0% 
(c) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+18.3% 
0.0% 
+22.1% 
0.0% 
+25.5% 
0.0% 
(d) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+15.7% 
+5.3% 
+19.5% 
+6.6% 
+22.5% 
+10.5% 
 
 
Scenario 2: SGC = 9%, and 25-year mortality improvement factors. 
 
Under the lighter mortality assumption (25-year mortality trends), the differences in income 
and pension savings over the four policy options are given below. 
 
                                                 
33 The figures in this column can be derived from table 5: with policy (a) average income equal to 24,963, the 
policy (b) figure of 26,696 represents a 6.9% increase, 30,481 is a 22.1% increase, and 29,836 is a 19.5% 
increase. 
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Table 7: Changes in average per annum income and pension costs, under 9% SGC and 25-
year mortality trends 
Policy 
option 
 
 Investment Earnings 
 20% Lower Base Case 20% Higher 
(a) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost  
- 
- 
- 
-  
(b) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+3.0% 
+0.0%  
+3.6% 
0.0% 
+4.1% 
+0.0%  
(c) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+14.1% 
0.0% 
+17.3% 
0.0% 
+20.2% 
0.0% 
(d) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+19.6% 
-10.3% 
+21.7% 
-10.5% 
+22.6% 
-7.5% 
 
Again, increases in individual income are evident but for policy options (b) and (c), this 
is to a lower degree than under 100-year mortality improvements. This is expected as the 
lighter mortality gives a smaller annuity payment at retirement.  
However, the results under policy option (d) strongly highlight the need for the pension 
eligibility rules to take account of changes in future mortality. Higher individual incomes are 
derived, but this is now at a cost of higher pension payments than the current situation. It is 
clear that a change in the assumed mortality rates requires additional revision of age pension 
means-testing to ensure that retirees are not benefitting from a compulsory annuitisation 
policy at the expense of tax-payers.  
 
 
 
Scenario 3: SGC = 12%, and 100-year mortality improvement factors. 
 
Naturally the additional contributions under 12% SGC lead to a higher average income 
overall, under the base mortality and investment assumptions.  
 
Table 8: 9% SGC versus 12% SGC 
Policy 
Option 
Average 
Income under 
9% 
Average 
Income under 
12% 
Pension saving 
under 9%1 
Pension saving 
under 12%1 
(a) $24,963 $27,323 - - 
(b) $26,696 $29,482 +0.0% +0.0% 
(c) $30,481 $34,257 +0.0% +0.0% 
(d) $29,836 $33,354 +6.6% +11.2% 
1 When considering the change in per annum income compared to policy option (a) for that 
level of SGC. 
 
Sensitivity to investment earnings are given below. 
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Table 9: Changes in average per annum income and pension cost, under 12% SGC and 
100-year mortality trends 
Policy 
option 
 
 Investment Earnings 
 20% Lower Base Case 20% Higher 
(a) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(b) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+7.0% 
+0.0% 
+7.9% 
+0.0% 
+8.7% 
+0.0% 
(c) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+22.2% 
+0.0% 
+25.4% 
+0.0% 
+28.0% 
+0.2% 
(d) 
Increase in income 
Saving in pension cost 
+19.4% 
+7.2% 
+22.1% 
+11.2% 
+23.7% 
+19.9% 
 
As expected, not only do higher overall incomes eventuate but there are also higher 
relative benefits of compulsion with 12% SGC. The average income increases due to 
compulsion by 7.9%, compared to 6.9% with 9% SGC. There is also a greater average saving 
in the cost of the age pension compared to that under 9% SGC. This ‘welfare improving’ 
situation is of much interest given the obvious public policy goals – to improve individual 
situations, at a lower public cost than otherwise.  
The results for 12% SGC demonstrate less sensitivity to changes in the assumption 
settings compared to an SCG of 9%, for policy option (d). This is indicated by the smaller 
range of the average increase in per annum income under 12% SGC (19.4%, 23.7%) 
compared to that under 9% SGC (15.7%, 22.5%).  
However, with a 12% SGC rate the sensitivity analysis indicates that while incomes 
increase for the majority of retirees, adjusting the investment earnings assumption results in 
some individuals between the 20th and 30th percentiles receiving lower per annum incomes. 
This is due to the interaction of assumptions regarding homeownership with age pension 
means-testing, whereby the removal of the assets test and strengthening of the income test 
leads to a faster decrease in the rate of eligible pension payment for individuals in the 30th 
percentile. The implication is that additional revision of means-testing and other economic 
policies that affect retirement incomes is required when the assumption settings change.  
The overall analysis shows that the effect of compulsory annuitisation on income is 
larger for those at either end of the range for superannuation balances at retirement. The 
highest per annum incomes are naturally achieved under 100-year trend mortality 
improvements, 12% SGC and an assumption of higher investment earnings, but within this 
scenario there are individuals who would potentially be worse off. Additionally there is only 
a minor saving in the cost of the age pension (0.2%).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conjunction with the Government provided age pension, compulsory annuitisation 
provides a policy option by which to guarantee all individuals a certain level of income in 
retirement.  The analysis quantifies, for a single male under certain assumptions34, a range of 
                                                 
34 The authors acknowledge that there are a number of limitations with any set of adopted assumptions. For 
example, some rely on general relationships between the variables such as individuals in the bottom 30th 
percentile of superannuation balances being non-homeowners. Many parameter values adopted are estimates 
based on past experience, which may not necessarily be representative of the future; characteristics such as the 
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increases in income and changes in the cost of the age pension. The higher annual incomes 
apparent in moving through the policy options arises due to firstly, a reduced price for 
annuities due to a more effective pooling of longevity risk, and secondly the underlying 
assumptions around government versus private provision. The more effective pooling arises 
because mortality experience will more closely reflect that of the general population as 
opposed to a ‘select’ population under voluntary annuitisation. 
Scenario 1 shows that compulsory annuitisation is potentially welfare improving, with a 
decrease in the average cost of the age pension and all individuals expected to receive higher 
incomes in retirement. However other scenarios demonstrate that potential benefits are 
dependent on future experience regarding mortality improvements, investment earnings and 
the level of superannuation contributions. Results were shown to be more sensitive to a 
change in mortality experience than to changes in the other parameters: in particular, an 
improvement in mortality experience converts the change in the average cost of the age 
pension from a saving to a loss. This reinforces that ongoing revision of age pension means-
testing is required in order to strike a balance between improving income levels in retirement 
and increasing the financial burden for tax-payers. 
The suggestion of compulsion may or may not be a politically acceptable approach, but 
nonetheless sets out one way to view Australia’s retirement income system which, in light of 
current future expectations, is becoming an increasingly important issue. Given the trends 
toward an ageing population, an increasing cost of funding the age pension and in light of the 
significant risks an individual faces in retirement, a compulsory annuitisation policy could 
potentially benefit Australia in its entirety by ensuring individuals use their superannuation 
balances for their intended purpose: to fund their retirement.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Future research could consider other factors that impact income in retirement, such as 
voluntary superannuation contributions, rent assistance payments, income from other sources, 
and the utility of other products. Analysis in response to obvious objections to compulsion 
such as the treatment of those in poor health are not developed at this stage. Additionally, 
changes in expenditure levels during retirement are not accounted for in terms of adequacy 
but rather, the stated industry norms are adopted. The research could be extended to analyse 
the expected effects for other cohorts such as females, couples and part-time employees. This 
would be required to estimate the overall impact compulsory annuitisation could have for all 
retirees.  
Alternative policy variations of compulsory annuitisation could be investigated, as the 
results are clearly dependent on the particular policy adopted. Having options of guaranteed 
or value-protected annuities; and considering the role that the Government could play under 
private provision of annuities are two such areas of interest35. 
                                                                                                                                                        
working status of individuals do not change over the projection period; and future mortality is highly uncertain. 
The overall sensitivity analysis adopted attempts to display some of the uncertainty involved in the major 
assumptions. 
35 This is especially so given that the large increases in income under policy options (c) and (d) are due not just 
to directly attributable advantages of compulsion, but the elimination of profit and commission criteria under 
government provision. As such an analysis of the potential impacts of compulsory annuitisation on expenses in 
annuity pricing would also provide a more detailed understanding of the financial implications of such a policy. 
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APPENDIX A: ASSUMPTIONS FOR PROJECTION OF SUPERANNUATION 
BALANCES 
 
Table 10 summarises the adopted distribution of salaries and superannuation balances for 30 
year-old males, as at 2009 as this is the starting year for projections. All values are in 2009 
dollars.  
 
Table 10: Distribution of Salaries and Superannuation Balances for males aged 30, 2009 
Salary (per 
annum)36 
Starting Superannuation 
Balance37 
Percentile of 
population 
$12,100 $7,509 9% 
$24,200 $9,930 20% 
$36,300 $12,869 34% 
$48,400 $19,438 54% 
$60,500 $36,977 71% 
$90,751 $77,627 92% 
Source: ABS (2008b, 2009a) 
 
Salaries increase over time due to inflation, productivity and promotion. For increases 
due to inflation and productivity, 4% per annum was assumed38. For increases due to 
promotion, estimates from the Survey of Income and Housing Costs Confidential Unit 
Record Files (ABS, 2007a)39 were used. Table 11 shows the assumed promotional increases 
implied from the earnings profiles: 
 
Table 11: Promotional Salary Increase Assumptions, males 
 Promotional Salary Increases  
(% per annum at age and income quartile shown) 
Age Attained Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile 
27 2.1 2.6 3.6 
32 0.0 1.0 1.4 
37 0.0 0.0 1.0 
42+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Data on the salary distribution for the 25 - 34 age cohort of males was extracted from the ABS 2005-06 
Regional Wage and Salary Earner Statistics. Values were inflated to reflect 2009 prices using Average Weekly 
Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE) for full-time males (ABS, 2009b).  
37Given that superannuation contributions are calculated as a proportion of an individual’s employment income, 
a proportional relationship between salary and superannuation balance as at 2009 was assumed. Data on the 
distribution of superannuation balances for the 25 - 34 age cohort of males was extracted from the 2007 Survey 
of Employment Arrangements, Retirement and Superannuation (ABS, 2008b). Balances corresponding to the 
salary percentiles were interpolated from this distribution, and were inflated to reflect 2009 prices by applying 
the change in AWOTE (ABS, 2009b). 
38 This is the increase in Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) from March 2004 to March 2009 (RBA, 2009a) and 
is consistent with the Commonwealth’s long-term view on general salary increases (Mercer, 2009). 
39 The extracted earnings profiles of males are cross-sectional, implying that any differences in income across 
age groups can be attributed to promotional increases or differences in the population distribution for the age 
groups. The profiles suggest that the rate of promotional increases are greater for higher incomes and also 
persist for longer. The promotional salary increases for the lower income quartile are relatively small, and the 
aggregate effects of promotional salary increases are also small relative to the assumed 4% for general salary 
increases. 
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Economic Assumptions 
 
The nominal investment earnings rate, net of management fees, was assumed to be 6.35% per 
annum, which equals the 10-year rolling return to June 2009 on a balanced investment 
option40. Tax on contributions and investment earnings was assumed to remain at the current 
rate of 15%. 
General inflation was assumed at 2.5% per annum, consistent with the Reserve Bank of 
Australia target of CPI (Consumer Price Index) being in the range of 2% - 3%, as well as well 
as the long-term inflation forecasts of the 2007 Intergenerational Report and the RBA’s 
August 2009 Statement on Monetary Policy (Treasury, 2007; RBA, 2009b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 This assumption was considered to be appropriate, given that over 80% of major super fund members invest 
in the default option, which is commonly a balanced investment option (Super Ratings, 2009), and is consistent 
with the Commonwealth’s view on long-term nominal investment returns (Mercer, 2009). 
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APPENDIX B: FITTED REGRESSION FOR SUPERANNUATION PROJECTIONS 
 
A polynomial regression was fit to the point estimates of superannuation balances. A 
regression without an intercept, as well as parabolas and straight lines (each with and without 
intercepts) were found to be inferior fits according to the p-values, R square and Adjusted R-
square measures41. The regression statistics of the resulting distribution are shown in Table 
12.  
 
Table 12: Regression statistics 
 Coefficients Standard Error P-value R Square Adjusted 
R Square 
Intercept 97738 24925 0.0172 
0.9792 0.9740 (Percentile)1.5 723721 52691 0.0002 
 
The distribution of superannuation balances between the 5th and 95th percentiles is shown 
below: 
 
Fitted regression for distribution of superannuation balances for males aged 67, 2046 
($2009) 
1 0 5 ,8 3 0
7 6 7 ,8 6 5
3 5 3 ,6 1 2
0
1 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 0 0 ,0 0 0
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
4 0 0 ,0 0 0
5 0 0 ,0 0 0
6 0 0 ,0 0 0
7 0 0 ,0 0 0
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
9 0 0 ,0 0 0
0 .0 0 0 .2 0 0 .4 0 0 .6 0 0 .8 0 1 .0 0
P e rce n ti
 
 
 
The fitted model is:  
 
Superannuation balancei = 97,738 + 723,721(percentilei)1.5, for 0.05 < i < 0.95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 While a parabola with an intercept provided a comparable fit to the data according to these measures (an R-
square and Adjusted R-square measure of 0.9756 and 0.9695 respectively), it was not favoured over the adopted 
regression primarily due to the degree of over-estimation for balances in the 20th percentile. It is considered that 
greater weight should be given to the point estimate for the 9th percentile because individuals in lower 
percentiles are more likely to qualify for the age pension. 
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APPENDIX C: ASSUMPTIONS FOR AGE PENSION PROJECTIONS 
 
Homeownership Status And Level Of Assessable Assets At Retirement 
 
Individuals in the top 70th percentile of superannuation balances were assumed to be 
homeowners, given that 69% of single individuals aged over 65 own their own home without 
a mortgage (ABS, 2009c), and that the probability of being a homeowner increases with 
overall wealth42. 
Superannuation balances and the value of owner-occupied dwellings (where applicable) 
are the two main assets of households (ABS, 2007b). With the family home excluded from 
the age pension asset test, assessable assets were assumed to be based on superannuation 
balances at retirement. Policy options (a) to (c) assumed individuals in the 30th percentile had 
assessable assets equal to 75% of their superannuation balance (with the balance of the 
superannuation account after annuitisation assumed to settle outstanding debts), and those in 
the top 70th percentile were assumed to be debt-free and their assessable assets were assumed 
as 100% of their superannuation balance.  
 
Discount Rate 
 
It is common practice to assume that the nominal risk-free discount rate is the current yield 
on an Australian Government bond with 10-year maturity (Officer & Bishop, 2008). A figure 
of 5.5% per annum was therefore assumed as this is the average per annum yield between 
June 2004 and June 2009, and the per annum yield as at June 2009. Given the long-tailed 
nature of age pension payments, this was assumed as the nominal discount rate, and when 
adjusted for inflation (CPI) a real risk-free discount rate of 3% was obtained. 
 
Mortality experience 
 
The Australian Government Actuary (AGA, 2004) produces official mortality tables for tax 
and social security purposes, therefore the AGA 2000-02 Mortality Table for males was 
assumed to represent current mortality rates (qx)43. For projected mortality, mortality 
improvement factors from the AGA were adopted44. These are given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Given an absence of information regarding the distribution of wealth for single individuals aged 67 and over, 
the superannuation balance at this age is taken, where required, as an indication of relative wealth throughout 
the analysis. 
43 In contrast to more recent ABS tables, the AGA tables calculate exposure on actual population, rather than the 
estimated resident population. The AGA 2000-02 and ABS 2005-07 (ABS, 2008c) mortality rates for males are 
similar between the ages of 67 and 89, but if the ABS rates were assumed, then mortality rates after age 89 
would be heavier than the true mortality rates, as estimated by the AGA.  
44 These are the 25-year and 100-year mortality improvement factors, with the 25-year improvement factors 
representing greater levels of improvement. The improvement factors are calculated as geometric averages over 
the relevant periods and then smoothed using spline functions. 
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Table 13: Mortality rates and improvement factors, males from age 67 
  Mortality Improvement Factors  
Age qx 25-year trend (%) 100-year trend (%) 
67 0.0173 -2.9235 -1.0391 
68 0.0191 -2.8659 -1.0011 
69 0.0211 -2.8065 -0.9554 
70 0.0234 -2.7453 -0.9025 
71 0.0259 -2.6826 -0.8537 
72 0.0287 -2.6183 -0.8268 
73 0.0318 -2.5526 -0.8153 
74 0.0353 -2.4856 -0.8024 
75 0.0392 -2.4174 -0.7893 
76 0.0435 -2.3481 -0.7774 
77 0.0482 -2.2779 -0.7666 
78 0.0534 -2.2067 -0.7520 
79 0.0588 -2.1348 -0.7376 
80 0.0640 -2.0622 -0.7319 
81 0.0697 -1.9891 -0.7214 
82 0.0769 -1.9154 -0.6988 
83 0.0855 -1.8415 -0.6650 
84 0.0951 -1.7673 -0.6269 
85 0.1056 -1.6643 -0.5890 
86 0.1165 -1.5648 -0.5516 
87 0.1276 -1.5083 -0.5191 
88 0.1386 -1.4633 -0.4923 
89 0.1493 -1.4271 -0.4716 
90 0.1593 -1.3967 -0.4593 
91 0.1683 -1.3693 -0.4562 
92 0.1764 -1.3421 -0.4593 
93 0.1844 -1.3123 -0.4648 
94 0.1931 -1.2769 -0.4710 
95 0.2021 -1.2332 -0.4799 
96 0.2107 -1.1556 -0.4942 
97 0.2193 -1.0747 -0.5123 
98 0.2278 -0.9938 -0.5329 
99 0.2363 -0.9129 -0.5723 
100 0.2448 -0.8319 -0.6415 
  Source: AGA (2004) 
 
Projected mortality rates for males in 2046 incorporating future improvements were 
calculated according to the following formula: 
 
qx(t) = qx x [1 + Ix/100]t-2009 
 
where, qx(t) = mortality rate at age x in year t;  
qx = current mortality rate at age x; 
Ix = rate of mortality improvement at age x. 
Table 14 shows the estimated mortality rates for males, should mortality improvements 
continue up to and beyond 2046, according to the 25- and 100-year mortality improvement 
factors.  
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Table 14: Projected mortality rates for males from 2046  
 qx according to mortality  
improvement factors 
Age 25-year trend 100-year trend  
67 0.0058 0.0118 
68 0.0063 0.0130 
69 0.0070 0.0145 
70 0.0077 0.0163 
71 0.0085 0.0182 
72 0.0094 0.0203 
73 0.0105 0.0224 
74 0.0117 0.0248 
75 0.0130 0.0274 
76 0.0146 0.0304 
77 0.0163 0.0336 
78 0.0183 0.0372 
79 0.0204 0.0409 
80 0.0226 0.0443 
81 0.0250 0.0482 
82 0.0281 0.0534 
83 0.0319 0.0600 
84 0.0363 0.0677 
85 0.0419 0.0763 
86 0.0482 0.0855 
87 0.0537 0.0948 
88 0.0590 0.1041 
89 0.0639 0.1130 
90 0.0685 0.1209 
91 0.0726 0.1273 
92 0.0763 0.1326 
93 0.0802 0.1375 
94 0.0848 0.1427 
95 0.0902 0.1478 
96 0.0978 0.1519 
97 0.1063 0.1554 
98 0.1155 0.1584 
99 0.1255 0.1591 
100 0.1364 0.1560 
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